American William M. Moon will also explain how he engaged next to US personnel in torture Russians visiting American nuclear missile bases - and how there also were many UNOFFICIAL PRIOR VISITS OF RUSSIANS to those
TWO YEARS AFTER, UKRAINE BECAME DISARMED ON BEHALF OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/BRITAIN IN EXCHANGE FOR A PIECE OF PAPER WHICH GUARANTEED IN RETURN BY RUSSIA HOW ONE WILL NEVER ATTACK UKRAINE....HERE IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN RANDOM AMERICAN ANIMALS BEGUN TO TAKE POLITICS IN THEIR OWN HANDS...WILLIAM MOON'S TREASON, HOWEVER, DIDN'T STOP THERE AND IT DIDN'T STOP AT ALL AS ANIMAL BECAME A REGULAR VISITOR OF OUR HOME IN NOVO MESTO WHERE HE BROKERED AMERICAN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY THROUGH PRIVATE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS....IT DID ENDED FOR RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS WITH MY DISPLAYING REVOLT AT AMERICAN BASE, BASED ON WHICH ARTICLE SUGGESTS RUSSIANS STOPPED SHORT FROM VISITING OTHER BASES WHICH I AM 100% CERTAIN DIDN'T IN REALITY...SAME REPEATED ON RUSSIAN SIDE WITH AMERICANS DOING THEIR BEST TO INVOLVE IN ME INTO RUSSIAN MENTAL GAMES WHO BEGUN TO REFER TO ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL AS "OURS"(asking me how to explain) TILL I STOPPED SCUM FROM GOING ANY FURTHER BY REJECTING RUSSIAN SIDE FROM FURTHER BLAH BLAH
TODAY AS THINGS ARE, I WOULD BREAK NOSES FOREMOST TO AMERICANS(I WAS TREATED LIKE AN ANIMAL - SLEEP DERIVED/EXHAUSTED AND AGAINST MY WILL) - BUT WHEN OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH ACTIONS EXISTED ANYTHING AS STATED HERE WOULD RESULT DESPITE MY BEING IN USA AT THE TIME IN DEATH. THATS HOW DEADLY IS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - NOT ONLY SLOVENIA. YOU EASILY DO NOT RETURN FROM SUCH MISSIONS OTHER THAN IN THE BODY BAG FOR WHATEVER CORONERS WRITE AS A REPORT OF DEATH ON YOUR CERTIFICATE. YEAH IT WAS GREAT FOR AMERICAN SIDE TO SEE RUSSIAN SIDE IS WHAT AMERICANS RUSHED TO CLAIM ME, BUT AS IS EVIDENT AMERICANS MADE SURE MY COMPLAINT WOULDN'T BE EVEN REMOTELY TOUCHED BY US JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION DESPITE USING ME FOR 52 YEARS. MOON CLAIMED SOMETHING WILL WITNESS FOR ME WHATEVER, I JUST WISH COULD GET COWARD IN MY HANDS FOR 10 MINUTES - CLEARLY EXPLAINS WHY SPINE BREAKING AND POISONING TOOK PLACE AND SCUM WANT TO "TESTIFY".
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UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR Arsenal SizeUkraine had 1,900 Soviet strategic nuclear warheads and between 2,650 and 4,200 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deployed on its territory at the time of independence in 1991. 176 Soviet ICBMs were located in Ukraine (130 SS-19 ICBMs and 46 SS-24 ICBMs), and 44 strategic bombers .
Kyiv inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union after its 1991 collapse but gave them up under a 1994 agreement, the Budapest Memorandum, in return for security assurances from Russia, the United States and Britain.1 day ago
When Russian Soldiers Toured U.S. Nuclear Missile Bases - November 30, 2024 08:59 GMT By Amos Chapple
A U.S. Army interpreter translates for Russian Strategic Rocket Forces colonels at the entrance to an access shaft into a Minuteman III nuclear missile silo.
The above photo, made in October 1996, is one of a handful held in the U.S. National Archives capturing the brief thaw in relations between Moscow and Washington that began as the U.S.S.R. neared collapse, and ended with the rise of Vladimir Putin.
Russian and U.S. inspection teams look into a U.S. Air Force Minuteman II training silo as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in South Dakota.
In December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the president of a soon-to-be-independent Russia, detailed to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker exactly how the Kremlin's nuclear strike system would be activated for an attack.
Russian generals are briefed on a missile launch training facility inside Montana's Malmstrom Air Force Base.
Yeltsin's surprising gesture of openness was followed by a series of concessions by both sides that would lead to thousands of nuclear warheads being removed from each country's arsenals.
Two senior officers from Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces sit in the chairs of a U.S. nuclear missile simulator used for training.
Russia and the United States agreed to significantly reduce the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons each country possessed, and to "de-target" others. Mutual visits to Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons facilities were planned as a way to maintain trust as the historic nuclear drawdown began.
William M. Moon (left) poses with Russian Major General Vladimir Frolov, who was in charge of the security of Russia’s nuclear weapons.
William M. Moon was the nuclear security program manager for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in several post-Soviet countries from 1992 to 2014. He experienced the occasionally frosty thaw of the 1990s firsthand.
A Russian major general fires a U.S.-made M249 light machine gun at a U.S. Air Force base's firing range.
Moon was responsible for arranging two visits by Russian generals to U.S. nuclear-warhead storage facilities. He told RFE/RL that on one of those visits, the Russian delegation members were each given personalized access passes but, inexplicably, the visitors swapped their passes among themselves. The move "generated a security violation that caused the Marine guards to draw their weapons to surround the delegation."
General Igor Sergeyev (left), the commander in chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, meets with Lieutenant General Dirk Jameson during Sergeyev's tour of U.S. military installations to "establish a rapport" with the United States in December 1993.
The commander of the base was "furious," Moon said of the ID card debacle. "It became impossible for those of us in the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to invite any Russian delegations to visit additional U.S. facilities."
Personnel from a U.S. missile maintenance squadron are introduced to General Igor Sergeyev in December 1993.
Remembering his own visits to nuclear-warhead storage facilities in Russia, Moon told RFE/RL the missions included, "riding in vans for three or more hours with the windows blacked out." He and his team were also restricted from carrying anything metallic. "I even had my boots taken away from me because they had metal protective toes in them."
U.S. sailors wear souvenir Soviet hats as they pose with local women in Vladivostok in September 1992 during a three day “goodwill port call” by the U.S. Navy.
Along with military visits to missile storage and launch facilities as part of treaty monitoring, the 1990s saw several goodwill exchanges by Russian and U.S. militaries.
Russian and U.S. sailors prepare to down shots aboard a Russian guided missile destroyer.
By the mid-1990s, relations between Moscow and Washington were beginning to sour over NATO's expansion eastward, and the Western alliance's increasing involvement in the Bosnian War. Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister under Yeltsin, described his U.S. counterparts as "little Western thugs."
A Russian serviceman explains the operation of a chaff launcher, designed to baffle enemy radar to crew members from a U.S. aircraft carrier in October 1992.
Moon says the meetings between U.S. and Russian militaries that began in the 1990s were suspended by Washington following Russia's annexation of Ukraine in 2014. The arms-treaty-compliance inspections were halted at the onset of the COVID pandemic, and then, Moon said, "Russia refused to resume inspections."
A Russian captain (center) speaks with U.S. Navy officers during his visit to the bridge of a U.S. guided missile cruiser.
Moon says looking back at the hopefulness of the 1990s, “it is deeply disturbing to me that after working so closely with the Russian Ministry of Defense for almost 20 years, including over 75 visits to Russia, that the Russians have cut off all communications and chosen to launch an unprovoked genocidal war against Ukraine.”
A Russian boy wears a U.S. naval officer's cap in Vladivostok.
Moon added, "I had hoped that my work would have resulted in further reductions in nuclear tension, but Russia has chosen aggression over cooperation."
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